Book Name MUHAMMAD: A PROPHET FOR OUR TIME Review written by Mr Kashif Iqbal.

This article fosters the significance of Muhammad Iqbal’s pacifist ethics in the post-9/11 world. In the post-9/11, there emerged a new world order in which violence emerged in many guises, including terrorism and war, which has devastated global peace since the advent of the twenty-first century. Undeniably, the threat of a nuclear war has been constantly harassing the world. Under these atrocious conditions, the question is whether Iqbal’s pacifist ethics could help achieve and sustain global peace. (...) class='Hi'>Iqbal was an empirically informed and trained philosopher in the early twentieth century in the Western and Islamic traditions. He witnessed the First World War and identified the factors of the Second World War, which had started just a year after his death. Iqbal identified that materialistic interests and colonial and imperial exploitations cause conflicts, eventually leading to violence and war. The recurrent problem is how we avoid the Third World War to sustain global peace. Iqbal’s ethics offer two ideas for achieving global peace: reverence for humanity and human fraternity. Reverence for humanity helps develop human potential, which promotes creative activities vital for positive peace. Human fraternity is the only dependable unity among human beings, despite their particular races, colours, cultures, or languages, for acquiring global peace. The article thus demonstrates the relevance and significance of Iqbal’s ethics in achieving and sustaining a peaceful co- existence in the world. (shrink)

This article explains Muhammad Iqbal’s politics of spiritual democracy and examines its applications to Pakistan and the contemporary world. Almost an official doctrine has emerged that Pakistan's creation is the result of Iqbal’s philosophy. If it is the result of the intended or unintended consequences of Iqbal’s philosophy, the question is whether Pakistan has adopted the version of his democracy. Iqbal’s ‘spiritual democracy’ stands contrary to the European model of democracy. European democracy, according to (...) class='Hi'>Iqbal, is materialistic and acquires the interests of the individual rather than the interests of humanity. Iqbal used the expression “spiritual democracy” once in The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, he did not explain it. I interpret Iqbal’s ‘spiritual democracy’ in the holistic sense of Hegel’s idea of abstract-concrete distinction. I argue that Iqbal used ‘spiritual democracy,’ ‘Muslim democracy,’ and Islamic democracy, interchangeably in his writings. Drawing on the key values of Islamic ethics, notably freedom, equality, and fraternity, Iqbal developed his idea of spiritual democracy, which posits the idea of an ideal society by discarding racial, cultural, ethnic, or linguistic disparities for acquiring the common good. This article explains four theses of Iqbal’s moral and political philosophy to make sense of his model of spiritual democracy: first, human beings have the potential to legislate laws to make this world livable. Second, all human beings are equal in the moral sense. Third, human beings are free and responsible agents. Fourth, human beings have fraternal relationships to each other. So, the article explains the salient features of Iqbal’s politics of spiritual democracy and determines its implications for Pakistan, and the contemporary world. (shrink)

This article explains Muhammad Iqbal’s ethics of reverence for humanity and determines how it fits with Islamic ethics. The cardinal goal of Islamic ethics is reverence for humanity. The Arabic expression ‘Islam’ means ‘peace’. The cardinal claim of Islamic ethics is that human beings deserve reverence because they are created with the best conformation. The Arabic phrase Ahsan al-Taqweem refers to the best conformation, which means a wide range of unique physical, metaphysical, moral, aesthetic and cognitive potentials. From (...) a broader perspective, Islamic ethics foster reverence for humanity based on three primary moral and political values: equality, freedom, and fraternity. Drawing on the Islamic tradition, Iqbal argues that all human beings are worthy of reverence irrespective of their racial, cultural, religious, or linguistic disparities because of their distinctive potentials, such as creativity, freedom, and knowledge. These potentials are preordained in human beings by birth. To develop these potentials, Iqbal posits his theory of egohood which fosters unique individuality. Under certain conditions, such as individual-society relationships, freedom, equality, and fraternity, Iqbal insists on developing these potentials to acquire the status of a perfect human. According to Iqbal, a perfect human is a God’s vicegerent on earth, who collaborates with Him in creation. Iqbal’s ethics of reverence for humanity emancipates human beings from poverty, war, violence, humiliation, discrimination, exploitation, hatred, and destruction. Yet, Iqbal’s ethics of reverence for humanity furnishes human beings with prosperity, peace, self-respect, equality, dignity, friendship, fraternity, and survival on earth. Thus, Iqbal’s ethics of reverence for humanity is consistent with Islam’s ethics of reverence for humanity. (shrink)

This article makes an exposition of the substantial cosmopolitan strands in Muhammad Iqbal’s writings. Cosmopolitanism is a philosophical approach that recognises human beings across nations to be members of a global tribe. This approach supports the idea of world citizenship, global state or global institutions. Individualism, egalitarianism and universalism are the key principles of cosmopolitanism. I argue that Iqbal is a cosmopolitan philosopher because his philosophical thinking is consistent with the core principles of cosmopolitanism and contains essential (...) cosmopolitan aspects, including intellectual, moral and political. Iqbal postulates the idea of the human self that acquires the idea of a unique individuality which is compatible with egalitarianism and universalism in certain ways. Iqbal’s intellectual cosmopolitanism fosters the cognitive development of people for enhancing their creativity, which is based not only on the oriental and the occidental traditions but also on the inter-temporal epochs with an interdisciplinary approach ranging primarily from philosophy, religion and literature to science. Intellectual cosmopolitanism produces creative human agency. Iqbal’s moral cosmopolitanism develops certain moral values to make human perfection and human fraternity. Iqbal’s political cosmopolitanism envisions a federation of states in which people practising spiritual democracy in the kingdom of ends on earth create and sustains global peace. These strands in Iqbal’s philosophical ideas create a creative human agency, human fraternity, reverence for humanity, and global peace, respectively. Thus, I argue that Iqbal meets all the conditions squarely to be a cosmopolitan philosopher. (shrink)

This article explicates the nature of social ontology. There are three social holist theses relevant to the problem: First, the individual and society are not independent of each other. Second, the development of the individual’s human potential depends upon the nature of society. Third, a good society cultivates rather than undermines human potential. To explore the problem, this paper juxtaposes Muhammad Iqbal and Philip Pettit, two social holist philosophers, who belong to the Islamic and Western traditions, respectively. Drawing (...) on the Islamic tradition, Iqbal argues that the individual cannot develop human potential, such as creativity, without a society. Iqbal’s social ontology, based on his theory of egohood, asserts that the individual ego (the individual) develops in relationship to the holistic ego (society). Iqbal repudiates a totalitarian society while supporting an Islamic society based on the principles of freedom, equality, and fraternity. In the Western tradition, Pettit posits an idea of holistic individualism by drawing on four contrasting social theories: atomism, holism, collectivism, and individualism. Pettit envisions a society that is neither totalitarian nor anarchic, but it is a creation of autonomous individuals. Hence, Iqbal’s and Pettit’s social ontological positions are significant to understanding the nature of society and their malign and benign roles in the social world. (shrink)

Muhammad Iqbal’s theory of egohood, also known as Khudi, selfhood, I-amness, or individuality, builds the foundation of his entire philosophical oeuvre. Despite a massive hoard of literature produced on the exposition of Iqbal’s theory of egohood, it is still elusive to grasp. Iqbal’s theory of egohood is a metaphysical theory that explains not only the ontology of the universe but also of human beings. An ego is an ontological substance: a unit of metaphysical or mental reality. (...) This substance refers to the unique individuality of the existing beings. Iqbal's metaphysics of egohood contradicts the pantheistic metaphysics developed by Ibn al-Arabi's writings in the Islamic tradition. To make sense of Iqbal's theory of egohood, I investigate three questions: first, why did Iqbal posit his theory of egohood? I argue that Iqbal developed his theory of egohood to reject the pantheistic metaphysics, which undermines the individualities of God and humans as autonomous agencies. According to Iqbal's metaphysics, God and human persons refer to autonomous individualities. Second, what is Iqbal's theory of egohood? Iqbal's theory of egohood explains the ontology of the psychical (mental or immaterial) world, the organic (living physical) world, and the inorganic (non-living physical) world. Iqbal uses the expression Supreme Ego for God, while (finite) egos for humans and other entities of the universe. Third, what does Iqbal want to do with his theory of egohood? Iqbal wants to explain his social, moral, political, and religious philosophies with his theory of egohood. So, the article intends to make sense of Iqbal's metaphysical theory of egohood. (shrink)

This paper aims to understand how we reason from historical premises to normative conclusions, tracing this question through the work of Muhammad Iqbal. On our reading, he wavers between two views of history, one a kind of natural science, and the other akin to religious interpretation. These tell different stories about the lessons we draw from history.

This paper attempts to rethink the philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) and challenge the still prevailing tendency in Iqbal scholarship to view it merely as an outcome of the influence of the ideas of various Western/European philosophers. I present Iqbal’s arguments in their particular historical and intellectual context to show that they developed in response to a specific philosophical problem and that Iqbal looked for a solution to that problem in Islamic tradition. I suggest that (...) Iqbal’s philosophy is best understood in the context of, and as a response to, the problem of nihilism as it was debated in modern German philosophy during ‘the pantheism controversy’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. To demonstrate this, I analyse Iqbal’s article on ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī to show his concern with the problem of nihilism, and his solution to it based on al-Jīlī’s Sufism. (shrink)

This seventh volume of Collected Papers includes 70 papers comprising 974 pages on (theoretic and applied) neutrosophics, written between 2013-2021 by the author alone or in collaboration with the following 122 co-authors from 22 countries: Mohamed Abdel-Basset, Abdel-Nasser Hussian, C. Alexander, Mumtaz Ali, Yaman Akbulut, Amir Abdullah, Amira S. Ashour, Assia Bakali, Kousik Bhattacharya, Kainat Bibi, R. N. Boyd, Ümit Budak, Lulu Cai, Cenap Özel, Chang Su Kim, Victor Christianto, Chunlai Du, Chunxin Bo, Rituparna Chutia, Cu Nguyen Giap, Dao The (...) Son, Vinayak Devvrat, Arindam Dey, Partha Pratim Dey, Fahad Alsharari, Feng Yongfei, S. Ganesan, Shivam Ghildiyal, Bibhas C. Giri, Masooma Raza Hashmi, Ahmed Refaat Hawas, Hoang Viet Long, Le Hoang Son, Hongbo Wang, Hongnian Yu, Mihaiela Iliescu, Saeid Jafari, Temitope Gbolahan Jaiyeola, Naeem Jan, R. Jeevitha, Jun Ye, Anup Khan, Madad Khan, Salma Khan, Ilanthenral Kandasamy, W.B. Vasantha Kandasamy, Darjan Karabašević, Kifayat Ullah, Kishore Kumar P.K., Sujit Kumar De, Prasun Kumar Nayak, Malayalan Lathamaheswari, Luong Thi Hong Lan, Anam Luqman, Luu Quoc Dat, Tahir Mahmood, Hafsa M. Malik, Nivetha Martin, Mai Mohamed, Parimala Mani, Mingcong Deng, Mohammed A. Al Shumrani, Mohammad Hamidi, Mohamed Talea, Kalyan Mondal, Muhammad Akram, Muhammad Gulistan, Farshid Mofidnakhaei, Muhammad Shoaib, Muhammad Riaz, Karthika Muthusamy, Nabeela Ishfaq, Deivanayagampillai Nagarajan, Sumera Naz, Nguyen Dinh Hoa, Nguyen Tho Thong, Nguyen Xuan Thao, Noor ul Amin, Dragan Pamučar, Gabrijela Popović, S. Krishna Prabha, Surapati Pramanik, Priya R, Qiaoyan Li, Yaser Saber, Said Broumi, Saima Anis, Saleem Abdullah, Ganeshsree Selvachandran, Abdulkadir Sengür, Seyed Ahmad Edalatpanah, Shahbaz Ali, Shahzaib Ashraf, Shouzhen Zeng, Shio Gai Quek, Shuangwu Zhu, Shumaiza, Sidra Sayed, Sohail Iqbal, Songtao Shao, Sundas Shahzadi, Dragiša Stanujkić, Željko Stević, Udhayakumar Ramalingam, Zunaira Rashid, Hossein Rashmanlou, Rajkumar Verma, Luige Vlădăreanu, Victor Vlădăreanu, Desmond Jun Yi Tey, Selçuk Topal, Naveed Yaqoob, Yanhui Guo, Yee Fei Gan, Yingcang Ma, Young Bae Jun, Yuping Lai, Hafiz Abdul Wahab, Wei Yang, Xiaohong Zhang, Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas, Lemnaouar Zedam. (shrink)

This article has begun pondering over the question of Islamic identity by narrating an ancient Muslim philosophers’ quotation. It could also be concluded with a poem from a modern Muslim philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938): “I have lived a long, long while,” said a fallen shore; “What I am know as ill as I knew of yore.” Then swiftly advanced wave from the Sea upshot; “If I roll, I am,” it said; “if I rest, I am not.” Both the (...) first and the last narration insist on a mobile and mosaic identity. Another side of Islamic Identity is related to Ummah, which is also flexible. The Quran describes immigration as an inevitable part of civilization. It was concerned with two great events during the prophet’s time – immigration to Ethiopia and emigration to Medina. It tries to connect worldly and spiritual interests in this topic where a kind of unity in plurality, the secular and sacred affairs meet. It notes that Muslims may migrate because of worldly needs but continue on with unworldly demands; and, indeed, it is possible to combine them rationally. So, focusing on story of immigration in the Quran helps one to better understand the Muslims’ mentality as well as help Muslims to deal with non-Muslims. Obviously immigration consists of some risks; sacrifices for immigrants and hospitality for hosts; but it is also full of opportunities as supported by the Quran. It is related to realizing the high capacity of humankind in facing different cultures and traditions; a mirror for self-knowing and other-knowing; the call to reform morally; to redefine and expand ethical values, to improve the social sphere and change the cultural monologue to dialogue. Finally immigration is a new way to look at God and religion; a new search for the definition of piety and reflects significant different perspectives from the light of the Quran, a misunderstood book in the West! (shrink)

Could some social kinds be natural kinds? In this paper, I argue that there are three kinds of social kinds: 1) social kinds whose existence does not depend on human beings having any beliefs or other propositional attitudes towards them ; 2) social kinds whose existence depends in part on specific attitudes that human beings have towards them, though attitudes need not be manifested towards their particular instances ; 3) social kinds whose existence and that of their instances depend in (...) part on specific attitudes that human beings have towards them . Although all three kinds of social kinds are mind-dependent, this does not make them ontologically subjective or preclude them from being natural kinds. Rather, what prevents the third kind of social kinds from being natural kinds is that their properties are conventionally rather than causally linked. (shrink)

Scientists cannot devise theories, construct models, propose explanations, make predictions, or even carry out observations, without first classifying their subject matter. The goal of scientific taxonomy is to come up with classification schemes that conform to nature's own. Another way of putting this is that science aims to devise categories that correspond to 'natural kinds.' The interest in ascertaining the real kinds of things in nature is as old as philosophy itself, but it takes on a different guise when one (...) adopts a naturalist stance in philosophy, that is when one looks closely at scientific practice and takes it as a guide for identifying natural kinds and investigating their general features. This Element surveys existing philosophical accounts of natural kinds, defends a naturalist alternative, and applies it to case studies in a diverse set of sciences. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core. (shrink)

This paper examines the phenomenon of ‘interactive kinds’ first identified by Ian Hacking. An interactive kind is one that is created or significantly modified once a concept of it has been formulated and acted upon in certain ways. Interactive kinds may also ‘loop back’ to influence our concepts and classifications. According to Hacking, interactive kinds are found exclusively in the human domain. After providing a general account of interactive kinds and outlining their philosophical significance, I argue that they are not (...) confined to the human realm, but that they can also occur elsewhere. Hence, I conclude by arguing that interactive kinds pose a challenge to scientific realism about kinds by making it difficult to make a distinction between real and non-real kinds. (shrink)

Asking whether the sexes are natural kinds amounts to asking whether the categories, female and male, identify real divisions in nature, like the distinctions between biological species, or whether they mark merely artificial or arbitrary distinctions. The distinction between females and males in the animal kingdom is based on the relative size of the gametes they produce, with females producing larger gametes (ova) and males producing smaller gametes (sperm). This chapter argues that the properties of producing relatively large and small (...) gametes are causally correlated with a range of other properties in a wide variety of organisms, and this is what makes females and males natural kinds in the animal kingdom. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the relationship between sex and gender: while the difference between the sexes is biologically grounded, the difference between genders is socially based. Since gender depends in part on the perception of sex, whether or not gender is real or not does not depend on whether sex is, since social reality is constituted in part by our perceptions. The claim that sexes are natural kinds in the animal kingdom does not imply that the biological differences among female and male humans do and should have social consequences. (shrink)

This paper attempts to articulate a dispositional account of innateness that applies to cognitive capacities. After criticizing an alternative account of innateness proposed by Cowie (1999) and Samuels (2002), the dispositional account of innateness is explicated and defended against a number of objections. The dispositional account states that an innate cognitive capacity (output) is one that has a tendency to be triggered as a result of impoverished environmental conditions (input). Hence, the challenge is to demonstrate how the input can be (...) compared to the output and shown to be relatively impoverished. I argue that there are robust methods of comparing input to output without measuring them quantitatively. (shrink)

Saba Mahmood’s anthropological work studies the gain in skills, agency and capacity building by the women’s dawa movement in Egypt. These women increase their virtue toward the goal of piety by following dominant, often patriarchal norms. Mahmood argues that “teleological feminism” ignores this gain in agency because this kind of feminism only focuses on opposition or resistance to these norms. In this paper I defend Mahmood’s “anti-teleological” feminist work from criticisms that her project valorizes oppression and has no vision for (...) a nonoppressive feminist future. I argue the future envisioned by teleological feminists gets caught in “the Hegelian” trap of replicating past oppression in their feminist future. I find in Mahmood’s work the tools to escape this trap. I argue, rather than a movement of overcoming oppression, Mahmood’s work suggests an immanent and creative movement that emphasizes difference for a truly new future. I turn to a Bergsonian metaphor and argue that this movement can be seen as akin to the movement of biological evolution. I conclude using the work of Eve Sedgwick that the Egyptian women that Mahmood studies are being read in a “paranoid” fashion and demonstrate using Leila Ahmed a better “reparative” reading of these women. (shrink)

I begin the first part by showing how situationism should make us question traditional understandings of virtues as intrinsic dispositions. I concentrate specifically on situationist experiments related to mood. I then introduce Islamic virtue ethics and the dawa movement. In parts two and three I examine ethnography of the dawa movement to explore how they deal with worries about the influence of mood on their virtue. In part two I show how they train their habits in very traditional virtue ethics (...) ways in order to be more resilient when faced with virtue-diminishing affective situations. In part three I show how the situation, rather than hindering practitioners, is recruited into helping these women achieve piety. I conclude, in part four, by showing the dawa movement's creative use of the Islamic veil as a way to help these women deal with the objection that one cannot avoid all bad situations. Going beyond social psychological experiments, I examine two methodological sources not found in situationist debates. First, I argue for ethnography as an empirical method through which to study virtue. I draw on ethnography of the Islamic women's dawa movement. Secondly, the work in the philosophy of mind on ‘affective scaffolding’. (shrink)

The incident of 1971 is a historical concern. Both wings of Pakistan were united at the time of the creation of Pakistan but some policies that were adopted after the creation of Pakistan were inadequate to resolve the growing differences between the both wings. Writers are divided regarding the causes of the Fall of Dhaka. Indian involvement has been highlighted frequently and it is also said that East Bengal was on the distance of 1000 km from West Pakistan. Apart from (...) these causes, this study will highlight a new perspective regarding the separation of East Bengal. From 1947 to 1971 the central governments of Pakistan took some measure regarding formulating policies and the policies were not sufficient to bring people of the both wings closer. Thus, the major policies and their consequences would be analysed in this paper. Further, this research would be a new one in a sense that there would be a general description of the policies from both wings. (shrink)

I will begin by proposing a taxonomy of taxonomic positions regarding the mind–brain: localism, globalism, revisionism, and contextualism, and will go on to focus on the last position. Although some versions of contextualism have been defended by various researchers, they largely limit themselves to a version of neural contextualism: different brain regions perform different functions in different neural contexts. I will defend what I call “environmental-etiological contextualism,” according to which the psychological functions carried out by various neural regions can only (...) be identified and individuated against an environmental context or with reference to a causal history. While this idea may seem innocuous enough, it has important implications for a structure-to-function mapping in the mind and brain sciences. It entails that the same neural structures can subserve different psychological functions in different contexts, leading to crosscutting psycho-neural mappings. I will try to illustrate how this can occur with reference to recent research on episodic memory. (shrink)

This paper advocates a dispositional account of innate cognitive capacities, which has an illustrious history from Plato to Chomsky. The "triggering model" of innateness, first made explicit by Stich ([1975]), explicates the notion in terms of the relative informational content of the stimulus (input) and the competence (output). The advantage of this model of innateness is that it does not make a problematic reference to normal conditions and avoids relativizing innate traits to specific populations, as biological models of innateness are (...) forced to do. Relativization can be avoided in the case of cognitive capacities precisely because informational content is involved. Even though one cannot measure output relative to input in a precise way, there are indirect and approximate ways of assessing the degree of innateness of a specific cognitive capacity. (shrink)

This paper discusses a philosophical issue in taxonomy. At least one philosopher has suggested thc taxonomic principle that scientific kinds are disjoint. An opposing position is dcfcndcd here by marshalling examples of nondisjoint categories which belong to different, cocxisting classification schcmcs. This dcnial of thc disjoinmcss principle can bc recast as thc claim that scientific classification is "int<-:rcst—rclativc". But why would anyone have held that scientific categories arc disjoint in the first place'? It is argued that this assumption is nccdcd (...) in one attempt t0 dcrivc csscntialism. This shows why the csscntialist and intc-:rcst—r<-zlativc approaches to classification arc in conflict. (shrink)

Naturalism about natural kinds is the view that they are none other than the kinds discoverable by science. This thesis is in tension with what is perhaps the dominant contemporary view of natural kinds: essentialism. According to essentialism, natural kinds constitute a small subset of our scientific categories, namely those definable in terms of intrinsic, microphysical properties, which are possessed necessarily rather than contingently by their bearers. Though essentialism may appear compatible with naturalism, and is indeed sometimes qualified with the (...) epithet “scientific,” it has become increasingly clear in recent years that only a minority of categories posited by science satisfy those conditions. I will not try to argue against essentialism directly in this chapter. Instead, I will attempt to articulate an alternative, naturalist conception of natural kinds, according to which the mark of natural kinds is their discoverability by science, not just basic science but the special sciences and even the social sciences. (shrink)

Philosophers and historians of science have made the claim that successive scientific theories are incommensurable, that is, that many or all of their concepts fail to coincide. This claim has been echoed by cognitive psychologists who have applied it to the successive conceptual schemes of young children, or of children and adults. This paper examines the psychological evidence for the claim and proposes ways of reinterpreting it which do not involve imputing incommensurability. An alternative approach to understanding conceptual change is (...) suggested, according to which novel concepts are introduced against a background of shared concepts, rather than as part of incommensurable conceptual schemes. (shrink)

This inquiry examines the question how the category of ‘religion’ generates a complex form of power oriented to the government of subjects. It does this through a critical reading of the right to freedom of religion, offered from the perspective of governmentality. It is argued that the right to freedom of religion enables the rational goals of government to relate to religiosity in such a manner that those subject to them are made at once freer and more governable ‘in this (...) world’. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a unified causal account of natural kinds. Using as a starting point the widely held view that natural kind terms or predicates are projectible, I argue that the ontological bases of their projectibility are the causal properties and relations associated with the natural kinds themselves. Natural kinds are not just concatenations of properties but ordered hierarchies of properties, whose instances are related to one another as causes and effects in recurrent causal processes. The resulting account (...) of natural kinds as clusters of core causal properties that give rise to clusters of derivative properties enables us to distinguish genuine natural kinds from non-natural kinds. For instance, it enables us to say why some of the purely conventional categories derived from the social domain do not correspond to natural kinds, though other social categories may. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger broadened the meaning of art to a truth-disclosing event akin to seemingly disparate events such as the founding of a political state, Jesus’s sacrifice for all humankind, and the questioning of a philosopher. Art makes us pay attention to it by presenting the familiar in a new and unfamiliar context and unsettles our presuppositions and reconceptualizes our way of thinking. I begin by explicating the Heideggerian interpretation of the nature of art by looking at the key concepts that (...) make a work of art work. Then I argue that by themselves, the concept of veiling and the concept of fashion are very familiar concepts to Indonesians, but that the practice of combining these two ideas brings something unfamiliar to that society. This new practice reveals a way of Being that combines religious piety with our current, late-modern, consumer society. The combination of fashion and veiling for piety discloses, in the Heideggerian sense, a new “world” that undermines secular and fundamentalist narratives about the religious agent while still remaining an authentic Indonesian art piece. (shrink)

Griffiths and Machery (2008) have argued that innateness is a folk notion that obstructs inquiry and has no place in contemporary science. They support their view by criticizing the canalization account of innateness (Ariew, 1999, 2006). In response, I argue that the criticisms they raise for the canalization account can be avoided by another recent account of innateness, the triggering account, which provides an analysis of the concept as it applies to cognitive capacities (Khalidi, 2002, 2007; Stich, 1975). I also (...) claim that they have not demonstrated that the folk notion of innateness is unsuitable for rehabilitation in a science of cognition. I conclude that they have not made the case that the notion of innateness ought to be eliminated from a scientific account of the mind. (shrink)

In this interview, which took place in July 2020, Muhammad Asghari, an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tabriz, asked eleven questions (via email ) to Professor Susan Haack, a distinguished professor of philosophy at the University of Miami. This American philosopher eagerly and patiently emailed me the answers to the questions. The questions in this interview are mainly about analytic philosophy and pragmatist philosophy. This interview was conducted via personal email between me and (...) Professor Susan Haack in July 2020. This interview, which Professor Hawk eagerly accepted, includes eleven questions about her biography and roles of various philosophers in her thought and finally about the influence of the philosophy of pragmatism on her thought. Of course, it goes without saying that the Haack's book Philosophy of Logic in Iran has been translated into Persian and he has published two articles in the quarterly journal of Philosophical Investigations (University of Tabriz) and I also have translated one of her articles into Persian. What was most interesting to me was the influence of pragmatism on Haack's thought that Charles Sanders Pierce, among classical American pragmatists, had as much influence on this philosopher's thought as John Dewey had in Rorty's thought. Here I thank Professor Susan Haack for answering my questions patiently and eagerly. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose the introduction of a neutrosophic chi-square-test for consistency, incorporating neutrosophic statistics. Our aim is to modify the existing chi-square -test for consistency in order to analyze imprecise data. We present a novel test statistic for the neutrosophic chi-square -test for consistency, which accounts for the uncertainties inherent in the data. To evaluate the performance of the proposed test, we compare it with the traditional chi-square -test for consistency based on classical statistics. By conducting a comparative (...) analysis, we assess the efficiency and effectiveness of our proposed neutrosophic chi-square-test for consistency. Furthermore, we illustrate the application of the proposed test through a numerical example, demonstrating how it can be utilized in practical scenarios. Through this implementation, we aim to provide empirical evidence of the improved performance of our proposed test when compared to the traditional chi-square-test for consistency based on classical statistics. We anticipate that the proposed neutrosophic chi-square-test for consistency will outperform its classical counterpart, offering enhanced accuracy and reliability when dealing with imprecise data. This advancement has the potential to contribute significantly to the field of statistical analysis, particularly in situations where data uncertainty and imprecision are prevalent. (shrink)

Functional reductionism concerning mental properties has recently been advocated by Jaegwon Kim in order to solve the problem of the 'causal exclusion' of the mental. Adopting a reductionist strategy first proposed by David Lewis, he regards psychological properties as being 'higher-order' properties functionally defined over 'lower-order' properties, which are causally efficacious. Though functional reductionism is compatible with the multiple realizability of psychological properties, it is blocked if psychological properties are subdivided or crosscut by neurophysiological properties. I argue that there is (...) recent evidence from cognitive neuroscience that shows that this is the case for the psychological property of fear. Though this may suggest that some psychological properties should be revised in order to conform to those of neurophysiology, the history of science demonstrates that this is not always the outcome, particularly with properties that play an important role in our folk theories and are central to human concerns. (shrink)

Kinds that share historical properties are dubbed “historical kinds” or “etiological kinds,” and they have some distinctive features. I will try to characterize etiological kinds in general terms and briefly survey some previous philosophical discussions of these kinds. Then I will take a closer look at a few case studies involving different types of etiological kinds. Finally, I will try to understand the rationale for classifying on the basis of etiology, putting forward reasons for classifying phenomena on the basis of (...) diachronic features, thereby making a provisional case for considering at least some etiological kinds to be natural kinds. (shrink)

There is a widespread assumption in cognitive science that there is anintrinsic link between the phenomena of innateness and domain specificity. Many authors seem to hold that given the properties of these two phenomena, it follows that innate mental states are domain-specific, or that domain-specific states are innate. My aim in this paper is to argue that there are no convincing grounds for asserting either claim. After introducing the notions of innateness and domain specificity, I consider some possible arguments for (...) the conclusion that innate cognitive states are domain-specific, or vice versa. Having shown that these arguments do not succeed, I attempt to explicate what I take to be the connection between innateness and domain specificity. I argue that it is simply easier to determine whether and to what extent domain-specific cognitive capacities are innate. That is,the relation between innateness and domain specificity is evidential or epistemic, rather than intrinsic. (shrink)

This article focuses on the interrelationship of law and life in human rights. It does this in order to theorize the normative status of contemporary biopower. To do this, the case law of Article 2 on the right to life of the European Convention on Human Rights is analysed. It argues that the juridical interpretation and application of the right to life produces a differentiated governmental management of life. It is established that: 1) Article 2 orients governmental techniques to lives (...) in order to ensure that both deprivation and protection of lives is lawful; 2) A proper application of Article 2 grounds itself on a proper discrimination of lives which causes Article 2 to be applied universally but not uniformly to all juridical subjects; 3) The jurisprudence of Article 2 is theoretically appreciable only in a ‘politics of life’. Finally, the article ends with a plea to analyse other fundamental human rights in the context of ‘biopolitical governmentality’. (shrink)

Criticism on Javanese mysticism of Syekh Siti Jenar.

General elections in Pakistan were held first time 7 December 1970. These were the decisive elections in a way that the democratic future of Pakistan was depended on the elections. The repercussions of the elections were so drastic. The present study will highlight and discuss the role of symbols and slogans that were used during the election years. The analytical and comparative study will show that the symbols used in the elections played very important role. There would also be discussion (...) that how these election symbols and slogans mold the situation in the favour of the political parties. In this way, the aim and objective of the study would be that it will made researchers able to look the elections scenario in a broad perspective. (shrink)

Two main theories of concepts have emerged in the recent psychological literature: the Prototype Theory (which considers concepts to be self-contained lists of features) and the Theory Theory (which conceives of them as being embedded within larger theoretical networks). Experiments supporting the first theory usually differ substantially from those supporting the second, which suggests that these the· ories may be operating at different levels of explanation and dealing with different entities. A convergence is proposed between the Theory Theory and the (...) intentional stance in the philosophy of language and mind. From this stance, concepts should not be thought of as concrete physical entities. (shrink)

Along with “paradigm” and “scientific revolution,” “incommensurability” is one of the three most influential expressions associated with the “new philosophy of science” first articulated in the early 1960s by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. But, despite the fact that it has been widely discussed, opinions still differ widely as to the content and significance of the claim of incommensurability.

There are many ways of construing the claim that some categories are more “natural" than others. One can ask whether a system of categories is innate or acquired by learning, whether it pertains to a natural phenomenon or to a social institution, whether it is lexicalized in natural language or requires a compound linguistic expression. This renders suspect any univocal answer to this question in any particular case. Yet another question one can ask, which some authors take to have a (...) bearing on the issue of the naturalness of categories, is whether a system of categories constitutes a unique way of organizing a particular set of entities or phenomena, or whether there are other legitimate classification schemes that can coexist with it. Another way of putting this is by asking whether systems of categories can cut across one another, and if so, under what circumstances. Some philosophers have claimed that crosscutting systems of categories cannot exist as genuine natural kinds. This paper examines that claim and puts forward some counterexamples, concluding that this notion of natural kind is not in tune with scientific classification and ought to be rejected in favor of an alternative. (shrink)

Among philosophers working on modality, there is a common assumption that there is a strong connection between temporal possibility and counterfactual possibility. For example, Sydney Shoemaker 1998, 69 70) writes: It seems to me a general feature of our thought about possibility that how we think that something could have differed from how it in fact is [is] closely related to how we think that the way something is at one time could differ from the way that same thing is (...) at a different time. In possible worlds jargon, the ways one and the same thing of a given sort can differ across worlds correspond to the ways one and the same thing of that sort can differ at different times in the same world. Could I have been a plumber or an accountant instead of a philosopher? The answer seems to be yes -- and this goes with the fact that we acknowledge the possibility of a scenario in which someone who was exactly as I was at some point in my life undergoes a series of changes resulting in his eventually being a plumber or an accountant. In a footnote, he acknowledges that this connection between counterfactual and temporal possibility needs to be qualified in response to an objection by Randy Clarke: «The property of being the child of someone who has visited Paris is not one that one can have and then lose; but it is one that one can have in the actual world and not have in some other possible world.» (1998, 75n.9) Therefore, he restricts the inference from temporal to counterfactual possibility and vice versa to «non historical properties.». (shrink)

One contentious issue in contemporary interpretations of medieval Islamic philosophy is the degree of esotericism espoused by its proponents, and therefore the degree of interpretive effort required by its modem readers to ascertain the author's real beliefs. One philosopher who has been accused of esotericism is Averroes (Ibn Rushd), particularly because he is quite explicit in distinguishing among the different types of reasoning appropriate to different classes of people: philosophers, theologians, and laypersons. But on closer inspection Averroes appears to have (...) at his disposal some subtle strategies for achieving partial reconciliation between religion and philosophy, strategies which do not actually involve falsifying the views of either side, although that is how it might appear at first sight. These polemical devices appear most clearly in his exchanges with the theologians (mutakallimun) of the Ash'arite school, of which Ghazali is the most original representative. In this paper I will examine Averroes's position on two sensitive matters, the creation of the universe and the possibility of miracles, in order to illustrate the use of what may be called his "method of re-interpretation," whereby certain key terms are interpreted in such a way as to emphasize the agreements between the two sides while downplaying the differences. (shrink)

Microphysical realism is the position that the only real entities and properties are found at the most fundamental level of nature. In this article, I challenge microphysical realism concerning properties and natural kinds. One argument for microphysical realism about entities, the “nothing-but argument,” does not apply to properties and kinds. Another argument, the “causal exclusion argument,” cannot be sustained in light of modern physics. Moreover, this argument leads to an objection against microphysical realism, based on the “illusoriness of macroproperties.” Another (...) objection is based on the possibility that there is no fundamental level but a “bottomless pit.”. (shrink)

Understanding Arab public opinion is central to the search for sustainable po- litical solutions in the Middle East. The way Westerners think about Arab public opinion may be affected by how it is referred to in their news media. Here, we show that Arab public opinion is rarely referred to as such in the US media. Instead, it is usually referred to as the Arab street, a metaphor that casts Arab public opinion as irrational and volatile. We trace the origins (...) of this metaphor to similar expressions in both English and Arabic, and note similarities and impor- tant differences between the English and Arabic usages. Ultimately, we argue that the Arab street metaphor misrepresents the Arab public, and invites dismissal of rather than engagement with Arab public opinion. (shrink)

Using a time-lagged design, we tested the main effects of Islamic Work Ethic (IWE) and perceived organizational justice on turnover intentions, job satisfaction, and job involvement. We also investigated the moderating influence of IWE in justice–outcomes relationship. Analyses using data collected from 182 employees revealed that IWE was positively related to satisfaction and involvement and negatively related to turnover intentions. Distributive fairness was negatively related to turnover intentions, whereas procedural justice was positively related to satisfaction. In addition, procedural justice was (...) positively related to involvement and satisfaction for individuals high on IWE however it was negatively related to both outcomes for individuals low on IWE. For low IWE, procedural justice was positively related to turnover intentions, however it was negatively related to turnover intentions for high IWE. In contrast, distributive justice was negatively related to turnover intentions for low IWE and it was positively related to turnover intentions for high IWE. (shrink)

This essay will explore some of al-Farabi’s paradoxical remarks on the nature and status of the democratic city (al-madinah al-jama'iyyah). In describing this type of non-virtuous city, Farabi departs significantly from Plato, according the democratic city a superior standing and casting it in a more positive light. Even though at one point Farabi follows Plato in considering the timocratic city to be the best of the imperfect cities, at another point he implies that the democratic city occupies this position. Since (...) Farabi’s discussion of imperfect cities is derived from Plato’s Republic and follows it in many important respects, I will argue that his departure from Plato in this context is significant and points to some revealing differences between the two philosophers. In order to demonstrate this, I will first set up a comparison between Plato’s conception of the democratic city and Farabi’s. Then I will propose three explanations for the greater appreciation that Farabi seems to have for democracy, as well as for the apparent contradiction in Farabi’s verdict concerning the second best city. (shrink)

Abstract: The aim of the research is to identify the reality of the quality of health services in light of the Corona Pandemic, and in order to achieve the research objectives, the researchers used the descriptive and analytical approach using a comprehensive survey method for the total research community, whose number reached (110) individuals, while (90) were recovered: The level of health service quality is of relative weight (76%). Among the most important recommendations made by the research: Work to pay (...) a health risk premium to all workers in health centers, in addition to paying attention to training and building work teams in various fields to improve the quality of health services provided. (shrink)

Researchers in the cognitive sciences often seek neural correlates of psychological constructs. In this paper, I argue that even when these correlates are discovered, they do not always lead to reductive outcomes. To this end, I examine the psychological construct of a critical period and briefly describe research identifying its neural correlates. Although the critical period is correlated with certain neural mechanisms, this does not imply that there is a reductionist relationship between this psychological construct and its neural correlates. Instead, (...) this case study suggests that there may be many-to-many psychological-neural mappings, not just one-to-one or even one-to-many relations between psychological kinds and types of neural mechanisms. (shrink)